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Out-of-pocket Maximum Rules 
 under a Compulsory Health Care Insurance 
Scheme: A Choice between Equality and Equity1
Thierry Debranda, b and Christine Sorasitha 
Abstract 
Using the microsimulation model ARAMMIS, this study attempts to measure the 
impacts of introducing an out-of-pocket (OOP) maximum threshold, or a safety 
net threshold, on consumer copayments for health care financed by the abolition 
of the Long-term Illness Regime (ALD) in France. The analysis is based on a 
comparison of different safety net threshold rules and their redistributive effects on 
patients’ OOP payments. We attach particular importance to indicators that bring 
to light changes in OOP payment levels and measure their impact on the equity of 
OOP distribution. The first section outlines the French National Health System 
to provide a better understanding of the stakes involved in reforming the health 
care reimbursement rules under the Compulsory Health Care Insurance scheme. 
In the second section, we describe the hypotheses retained, the database and the 
microsimulation  model.  The  final  section  presents  key  findings,  measuring  the 
impact of the reform at both individual and system levels.
Keywords: Microsimulation, Health expenditure, Out-of-pocket payment.
Codes JEL: I18, H51, D63.
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Résumé
Bouclier sanitaire : choisir entre égalité et équité2 
Une analyse à partir du modèle ARAMMIS
Cet article cherche à mesurer, à l’aide du modèle d’Analyse des réformes de l’Assurance 
maladie  par  micro-simulation  statique  (ARAMMIS),  les  effets  de  la  mise  en  place 
d’un bouclier sanitaire financé par la suppression du régime des affections de longue 
durée (ALD). Notre étude repose sur la comparaison des conséquences redistributives 
de différentes règles de boucliers sur les restes à charge des patients dans le secteur 
ambulatoire en France. Nous attachons une importance particulière aux indicateurs 
permettant de mettre en évidence les modifications des restes à charge et de mesurer 
l’évolution du système en termes d’équité. Nous présentons, dans une première partie, 
le cadre général du système de santé en France pour mieux comprendre le contexte 
et  les  enjeux  d’une  refonte  du  mode  de  remboursement  lié  à  l’Assurance  maladie 
obligatoire. Dans une deuxième partie, nous décrivons les hypothèses retenues, la base 
de données et le modèle de micro-simulation. Enfin, nous consacrons la dernière partie 
à la présentation des principaux résultats mesurant l’impact de la réforme tant au niveau 
des individus qu’au niveau du système.
Mots-clefs: Micro-simulation, Dépenses de santé, Restes à charge.
Codes JEL: I18, H51, D63.
2  Les auteurs tiennent à remercier les participants aux séminaires de la Paris School of Economics et des mardis de 
l’Irdes, du Groink Assurance à l’Irdes et des Journées des économistes de la santé français. Nous tenons plus par-
ticulièrement à remercier A. Evans, B. Dormont et P-Y. Geoffard pour leurs commentaires. Ce travail trouve son 
origine dans les travaux réalisés par Al. Couillerot, S. Chambaretaud, T. Debrand et L. Rochaix en 2007 et d’une 
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Introduction
The  present  Social  Security  system  in  France  officially  came  into  being  with  the 
Ordinance of 1945, which established a pact of solidarity between all French citizens. 
‘A Social Security system has been instituted to guarantee workers and their families protection against 
social risks of  whatever nature susceptible of  reducing or impeding their ability to earn a living, to cover 
maternity costs or family expenses.’ Its aim is to protect individuals from social risks related 
to health, employment, the family and retirement. In terms of health, social protection 
is provided by a Compulsory Health Care Insurance scheme, to which contributions 
are mandatory, based on the fairly simple principle that ‘each pays according to their 
abilities and receives according to their needs.’ To this basic principle are added a certain 
number of schemes that permit health care costs partially covered by Social Security 
(Sickness Insurance) to be wholly reimbursed for certain diseases or under specific 
circumstances (e.g., long-term illness, or the ALD scheme, pregnancy, and occupational 
accidents). The system exhibits specific reimbursement characteristics: independent of 
income and remaining out-of-pocket payments (OOP) can be excessive (OOP payments 
are the difference between actual health expenditures and the amount reimbursed by 
Compulsory Health Care Insurance). 
Excessive or ‘catastrophic’ OOP payments can be defined in two ways. In the first 
definition, catastrophic OOP payments are associated with a period of illness that 
temporarily or durably deteriorates a patient’s health status and requires extremely 
expensive care that is not always reimbursed by the Compulsory Health Care Insurance 
scheme. In the second definition, OOP payments are considered as an absolute value 
measured against income or an individual’s ability to pay (Abul Naga and Lamiraud, 
2008).  In  this  case,  OOP  payments  are  qualified  as  ‘catastrophic’  if  they  lower  a 
household’s standard of living or if they represent a significant percentage of the 
household income over and above a certain critical threshold (Xu et al., 2003; Wagstaff 
and van Doorslaer, 2003; van Doorslaer et al., 2007; Pradhan and Prescott, 2002 and 
Flores et al., 2008). Economic literature provides a number of studies that estimate this 
threshold at between 5% (Berki, 1986) and over 40 % (Xu et al., 2003) according to 
country and social protection systems. 
Catastrophic  OOP  payments  are  an  indicator  of  a  health  insurance  system’s 
performance and can reveal insufficient risk coverage (Scheil-Adlung et al., 2006). The 
notion of equity in a reimbursement system effectively implies that households should 
be protected against such excessive expenditures. Moreover, a link between poverty 
levels and excessive health expenditures has already been established (Abul Naga and 
Lamiraud, 2008). According to Whitehead, Dahlgreeb and Evans (2001), an increase in 
OOP payments pushes some families down to the poverty level and aggravates hardship 
among families already at the poverty level. These additional health expenditures replace 
short-term consumption and long-term savings, thereby reducing families’ well-being. 
In France, even if the majority of excessive OOP expenses are captured by the specific 
health insurance schemes, high OOP expenses persist (Tabuteau, 2006). 
The way OOP payments are distributed between patients and the inequalities they 
generate have led public policy-makers and economists to question the sustainability 
of the current system and to imagine possible evolutions. One of these alternatives 
involves substituting the long-term illness scheme (ALD: system that provides 100% 
coverage for patients with a recognized chronic disease), with one that provides an Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                         4 
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OOP  maximum  threshold  or  a  copayment  safety  net  threshold3  (Bras,  Grass  and 
Obrecht, 2007). Briet and Fragonard (2007) present the interests, impacts and limitations 
of instituting a safety net system introducing a threshold on OOP payments. These 
authors consider that an OOP maximum threshold would protect households from 
catastrophic health expenditures, reduce the number of households foregoing care by 
protecting low-income households and, finally, simplify the current complexities of the 
reimbursement system whilst facilitating the control of public health spending. 
The nature of the OOP maximum threshold thus depends on the chosen definition of 
catastrophic OOP payments. Based on the first definition of catastrophic OOP, the safety 
net would introduce a uniform, fixed OOP maximum applicable to all and independent 
of income. If one retains the second definition, in which OOP payments are related to 
income, the safety net threshold would necessarily be determined according to income 
level. The notion of ‘equality’ in the distribution of OOP payments is defined as the 
equal treatment of all individuals, and ‘equity’ is defined as the notion of ‘proportional 
equality,’ suggesting that all individuals are treated equally but according to income level. 
Our objectives in this study are to simulate hypothetical reform models and to measure 
their redistributive effects. Particular importance is thus attached to indicators that enable 
us to measure the evolution of equity within the system under analysis. In this context, 
the study is structured as follows: The first section outlines the French National Health 
System to provide a better understanding of the stakes involved in reforming the health 
care reimbursement rules under the Compulsory Health Care Insurance scheme. The 
second section describes the retained hypotheses, the database and the microsimulation 
model, ARAMMIS (Analyse des Réformes de l’Assurance Maladie par Microsimulation 
Statique; Analysis of Health Insurance Reforms by Static Microsimulation). ARAMMIS 
is a static, exogenous microsimulation model built by IRDES with the aim of simulating 
different reforms by modifying the variables used in calculating the financial burden 
of the insured, such as reimbursement rates, financial contributions and the possibility 
of abolishing one or several forms of exoneration. The final section is devoted to 
presenting the key findings, using different tools to measure the impact of the reform 
at both individual and system levels.
1.  The stakes involved in reforming the reimbursement system 
In  France,  health  insurance  is  mainly  provided  by  the  Compulsory  Health  Care 
Insurance scheme. Essentially Bismarkian, the system was originally financed in the 
majority by employer-employee contributions. Around the mid-1970’s, with the arrival 
of mass unemployment, the reduced share of wages in the national revenue, the aging 
of the population and a certain desire for greater social justice, the system evolved to 
adopt a more Beveridgian logic, as it effectively became more and more dependent on 
financing from taxes (Palier, 2005). The health insurance scheme is essentially financed 
by social contributions deducted from earnings, income tax and other taxes, such as the 
General Social Tax (CSG). This supplementary income tax, created in 1990, accounts for 
approximately 30% of Compulsory Health Care Insurance funding. Contributions are 
thus income-related rather than risk-related, which can be interpreted as a redistribution 
mechanism that should guarantee a degree of equality between the insured in terms 
of health care costs. These statutory contributions cover a percentage of the health 
expenditures of all the insured. Other sources of health insurance funding come from 
3  For us, in this article an OOP maximum threshold and a copayment safety net threshold are synonymous.Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                        5 
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copayments, the percentage of a patient’s health expenditures that are not reimbursed 
by the insurance system (cf. Elbaum, 2008, for a more detailed presentation of patient 
contributions to health expenditures in France). 
Since the beginning of the 2000’s, the distribution of health expenditures reimbursed by 
the Compulsory Health Care Insurance system has remained relatively stable; 65% of 
expenditures concern ambulatory care (outside hospital care expenditures), even if the 
latest statistics indicate a slight drop. This relative stability in fact hides radical changes 
that occurred in the wake of two contradictory trends. The first was an increase in 
patients’ individual contributions, which effectively decreased collective contributions. 
The second came from the introduction of the Long-Term Illness scheme (ALD), 
through  which  an  increasing  number  of  insured  were  able  to  benefit  from  100% 
reimbursement of health care expenditures. The two together altered the nature of the 
reimbursement system. Stability is obtained through the selection of risks: the system 
provides less protection from small risks by increasing patients’ financial contributions 
and, on the contrary, provides better risk and expense coverage for patients that are 
chronically ill. Progressively, this risk selection leads to the ‘non-avowed’ questioning of 
the 1945 solidarity pact that in turn radically modifies the system’s redistributive effect.   
1.1.  Health insurance: increase in expenditures and patients’ financial   
  contributions 
The National Health Insurance system designers instituted patient copayments from 
the beginning with the introduction of the ‘ticket modérateur,’ a fixed copayment system. 
Uniformly applied to all of the insured, it can nevertheless have a negative impact on 
access to health care. The ‘ticket modérateur’ was legitimized, on the one hand, by the 
desire to reduce social injustices and, on the other, by its potential to reduce ex-post 
moral hazard by instilling a greater sense of consumer responsibility.   
Driven by technological progress, health care consumption behaviors and use rates, 
and to a lesser extent the impact of an aging population, health spending nevertheless 
continued to outpace national wealth (Grignon, Huber and Dormont, 2006). Public 
health expenditures increased more rapidly than public revenues (Elbaum, 2008). Since 
1950, successive governments have initiated a series of recovery plans. The Veil, Barrot, 
Seguin, Evin, Bianco  (and the followings) reform plans, initiated between 1967 and 
1995, concerned increases in contribution levels, cut-backs in the reimbursement of 
prescribed medicines, raising copayments for hospital care and the creation of a fixed 
copayment for hospital services. These reforms proved to be financially ineffective (the 
Health Insurance budget deficit still exists) and socially unjust (affecting all individuals 
whatever their income). Subsequent governments introduced more structural reforms 
with the aim of regulating the health system and modifying agents’ behaviors (Juppé 
Ordinances of 1995). The 2004 Douste-Blazy Reform Plan instituted the introduction 
of the fixed 1€ copayment for consultations, increased copayments for hospital services 
from 12 to 16€ and introduced the Personal Medical File aimed at coordinating a 
patient’s care path. In 2006, a fixed, universal copayment of 18€ on medical acts costing 
over 91€ was introduced and, in 2008, deductibles on prescribed drugs, paramedical 
care and transport. Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                         6 
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It should not be forgotten, however, that a reduction in Social Security reimbursements 
designed to more or less offset budget deficits can have an adverse effect on lower-
income populations that may be inclined to forego care in the face of increased costs. 
It can also significantly increase OOP payments for the chronically ill. 
1.2.  Health insurance and health and social risk coverage 
There are three main insurance systems, either ‘public’ or ‘private,’ to cover these two 
types of risk. 
The first, a ‘public’ insurance system, is the Universal Health Insurance Coverage (CMU- 
Couverture Maladie Universelle). It allows the most disadvantaged population group 
(individuals whose monthly income per consumption unit is below 598€) to benefit 
from 100% health expenditure  4 coverage that, in theory, exempts them from OOP 
expenses. The effects of this universal coverage are not analyzed in this study. 
The second, a ‘private’ insurance system, concerns supplementary health insurance. 
It  completes  the  reimbursement  levels  offered  by  the  statutory  health  insurance   
scheme5  (Grignon,  Perronnin  and  Lavis,  2008).  Even  if  93%  of  the  French  have 
supplementary insurance coverage (of which 7% thanks to the CMU), households 
without supplementary insurance are often the most fragile with the lowest income 
levels. Transferring the weight of reimbursements from National Health Insurance 
to  supplementary  insurance,  however,  may  result  in  increasing  health  inequalities 
and reinforcing the CMU threshold effect. The introduction of the ACS (Aide à la 
Complémentaire Santé) scheme, providing financial assistance for the acquisition of 
supplementary insurance, aims at limiting this threshold effect (Grignon and Kambia-
Chopin, 2009). Moreover, it should not be forgotten that supplementary insurance is 
paid directly or indirectly by individuals and that all the additional health care services 
covered by these private insurance schemes are rapidly translated into higher premiums 
paid by the insured. This is all the more problematic because the premiums are not 
proportional to income. 
Finally, the third system, a ‘public’ insurance scheme that will be dealt with more 
specifically in this study, concerns the Long-Term Illness Scheme (ALD). Individuals 
suffering from a chronic illness are covered at 100% for all expenses related to that 
specific illness. For any other unconnected health event, reimbursements come under 
the general insurance statutory insurance scheme. The ALD is not a medical concept 
but a medico-administrative one. Its aims are economic, on the one hand, by attempting 
to neutralize ‘catastrophic’ health costs and medical on the other hand, by ensuring the 
better follow-up care of patients recognized as suffering from a long-term illness. The 
list of recognized diseases does not include all chronic, costly diseases but rather focuses 
on diseases with high long-term therapeutic costs. The number of patients admitted to 
the ALD scheme increases by 3.5% every year (Païta and Weill, 2009). This scheme 
currently generates 62.3% of National Health Insurance reimbursements, whereas it 
only concerns 14.6% of the population insured, that is, 8.3 million individuals (Païta 
and Weill, 2008), and will represent over 70% of expenditures in 2015 (Obrecht, 2009). 
Despite its usefulness and importance, the ALD scheme is not without its shortcomings. 
Firstly, it creates ratchet effects: few individuals leave the scheme ‘voluntarily.’ Secondly, 
4  Health professionals are obliged to apply binding tariffs to individuals benefitting from the CMU (price fixed by the 
government without the possibility of charging above the statutory fee).
5  Supplementary insurance offers incomplete coverage. It does not, for example, cover deductibles.Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                        7 
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the diseases covered by the ALD scheme are extremely heterogeneous, and there is 
no correlation between the cost and gravity of an illness and its inclusion in the ALD 
scheme. Thirdly, it can be a source of inequalities. It is the General Practitioner (GP), 
in a one-to-one relationship with the patient in a specific environment, who decides 
whether or not the patient is eligible for ALD. Finally, it does not completely resolve the 
problem of catastrophic OOP payments for all the patients benefiting from the ALD 
scheme (Geoffard, 2006). 
This two-fold observation: the trend dynamics that point to an increase in the number 
of persons benefiting from ALD and the continued existence of large OOP payments 
lead to reflections on possible ways of improving the current system (Bras, Grass and 
Obrecht, 2007). One possibility would be to replace the ALD scheme with a system 
of OOP maximums. Briet and Fragonard (2007) proposed the safety net threshold for 
OOP payments, a system already in place in numerous European countries. 
2.  The reform: hypotheses, simulation tools and fields 
  of investigation
The idea is based on a system that would impose a safety net threshold for OOP 
payments. In other words, once the threshold is reached, additional health expenditures 
would be universally reimbursed at 100%, regardless of the disease or care motive. The 
ultimate goal is to find an equitable reimbursement system that is not simply aimed at 
curbing public health costs to the point of penalizing the sick.  
In Europe, countries such as Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Belgium have already instituted a system of OOP maximums either globally or by sector 
(Chambaretaud and Hartman, 2007). In Belgium and Germany, OOP maximums are 
fixed according to annual household income. In these countries, where copayments are 
intended to increase user responsibility with regards to health care consumption, recourse 
to supplementary insurance is limited, prohibited in Switzerland and non-existent in the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Compared to these countries, France appears to be behind in 
dealing with this issue but has several targeted protection mechanisms related to health 
status (insured through the ALD scheme) or status (e.g., pregnant women, the disabled 
and occupational accidents). These two systems (general insurance scheme with OOP 
maximums or specifically targeted policies) are seemingly incompatible 6. In European 
countries, another criterion aside from revenue can intervene in the definition of OOP 
maximums:  health  status.  In  Germany  and  Belgium,  specific  schemes  for  patients 
suffering from chronic diseases exist without a predetermined list of eligible diseases 
having been established beforehand. 
6  In all of these countries, however, there exist targeted protection mechanisms aimed at pregnant women and the 
elderly.Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                         8 
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2.1. Hypothetical OOP safety net threshold models
The reforms tested are based on several hypotheses: the abolition of the Long-Term 
Illness scheme (ALD), the creation of an OOP expenses safety net threshold and the 
neutrality of the insurance system (the health insurance system will neither gain nor 
lose from the reform). Mathematically, the condition statement optimization program 
consists of finding the OOP maximum that confirms the following equilibrium: 
where i represents the insured in our database, OOPcurrent are OOP payments before 
reform  and  OOPafter  are  OOP  payments  after  reform.  This  statement  condition 
optimization allows us to focus solely on the redistributive nature of OOP payments 
calculated according to a maximum threshold rule. The OOP maximum is defined 
as the threshold that protects the insured against ‘catastrophic expenses’ as, over and 
above that threshold, expenses would be covered at 100%. In this analysis, we chose 
to finance the safety net threshold scheme solely through the abolition of the ALD 
scheme. The CMU threshold rules are not altered. Where income is taken into account 
in the analysis, income level is taken as being above the CMU threshold.  
This being the case, the different safety net threshold levels only change in form and 
nature. We thus propose analyzing three OOP-safety net threshold models. 
-   The uniform threshold (UT) applies a uniform OOP threshold to all of the insured 
regardless of their incomes. This can be compared to the guaranteed stop loss offered 
by certain private insurance companies in the United States (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 
2000). In the framework of the French debate, the idea of a ‘sickness deductible’ 
was put forward by Simon7 (2007):
-   The income-related threshold (IRT) fixes an individual OOP threshold calculated 
according to gross annual income by consumption unit. The rule of proportionality 
is written as follows:
-   The income-related threshold with an increasing marginal effect (IRTM) is 
based on the preceding rule but marginally increases the proportionality coefficient 
by calculating OOP thresholds by income bracket: wealthier individuals will have a 
marginally higher OOP threshold before being eligible for 100% coverage: 
If income is below 1,200 €: 
If income is between 1,200 and 1,800 €:
If income is between 1,800 and 2,400 €:     
If income is over 2,400 €:
7  The proposition made by Simon (2007) was more ambitious in that it was based on the assumption that the current 
reimbursement system (health insurance reimbursement + copayment) would be replaced by a fixed, uniform de-
ductible. In all of our simulations, we maintained the current system to observe the effect of abolishing the ALD 
scheme exclusively. The ‘Simon’ simulation might be envisaged in the future.Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                        9 
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The income-related maximum threshold is very similar to the system of Maximum 
Billing (MAB) that was introduced in Belgium in 2002 (Schokkaert et al., 2008)
Threshold coefficients αUT, αIRT and αIRTM are calculated to guarantee the neutrality of 
the different reforms with regards to the Compulsory Health Care Insurance scheme.
The three OOP maximum models are each based on a different logic. The UT assumes 
that all individuals are treated identically regardless of income. Thus, it respects the 
principle of uniformity underlying the 1945 solidarity pact, ensuring that all individuals 
have an identical ‘maximum risk’ protecting them from excessive OOP payments. The 
UT hypothesis, however, fails to take into account individuals’ ability to pay: the financial 
participation related to income demanded from individuals with more modest incomes 
is greater than for those with higher incomes. The OPP threshold proposed by the UT 
model will not protect lower income individuals from catastrophic OOP payments in 
relation to their income. The IRT and IRTM models differ in the fact that thresholds 
are calculated taking income levels into account. For these two models, the copayment 
threshold increases according to income level, but for the IRTM, this increase is non-
linear8 (it will be lower for the lower income brackets and higher for the higher incomes 
than in the case of the IRT model). 
To take health status into account, as is the case in Germany (Busse and Riesberg, 
2004), we equally simulate threshold rules that distinguish the ALD from the non-ALD 
population (here, we use the indicator ‘being covered by ALD’ as a health status proxy). 
Each rule will therefore include a variant taking into account the ALD status of the 
insured. The threshold or coefficient of proportionality will be two times lower for 
the population on ALD. Although it may seem surprising to use the ALD criterion in 
establishing the OOP maximum rule when the ALD scheme is assumed to have been 
abolished, the idea is not to reinstate the ALD scheme but rather to use it as a medical 
criterion permitting the health status of the most chronically ill to be taken into account. 
2.2.   Interest of microsimulation models in health policy issues
Microsimulation models have proved efficient in analyses measuring the effects of 
administrative or fiscal reforms on individual agents: a case that applies to the projected 
OOP  threshold reform. Microsimulation is a  method of  investigation  based on  a 
representative sample of microeconomic units. The microsimulation method in its 
application to economic and social policies was originally defined from the end of the 
1950’s by Orcutt (1957). His aim was to study the evolution of a system: to study the 
impact of a new reform by using the characteristics of these microeconomic units. The 
microsimulation model thus stems from a database of individuals that aggregates the 
results obtained for each of the units in order to study the system as a whole. In general, 
one can distinguish between two main types of microsimulation models: static and 
dynamic9. The static model, the type used in this analysis, uses a cross-section database 
and a date t. Static models are essentially used to measure the immediate or short-term 
8  Mathematically, the second derivative of the income-related IRT threshold is equal to zero, whereas, for the IRTM 
threshold, it has a positive value.
9  The dynamic models use cross-section or longitudinal data, taking into account the demographic evolutions of the 
‘micro-units.’ The characteristics of each individual are updated on each timeline on the basis of assumed evolution 
(e.g., matrices, state transition equations and institutional rules). The number of rules thus evolves through time, 
taking into account marriages, births and deaths. Dynamic models are essentially developed in the framework of 
long-term public policy (e.g., pension reform and detailed demographic models).Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                         10 
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impacts of fiscal or social reform. New reforms can thus be simulated to measure the 
effects of policy on income distribution at the individual level and estimate the impact 
at the microeconomic level. These models are frequently used in Anglo-Saxon countries 
as an aid to policy-makers (for a more general presentation, see Gupta and Harding, 
2007). 
One of the areas in which microsimulation models have been applied is public health 
policy (Breuil-Grenier, 1999). In France, unfortunately, even if a number of models 
demonstrated an interest in using this method to unravel the complexities of the health 
system (Lachaud, Largeton and Rochaix, 1998), these were temporary, study-specific 
rather than permanent models. The ARAMMIS model was created by IRDES to fill this 
gap. Specifically, one of our aims is to create a microsimulation model that is permanent, 
easy to handle and that can take into account several decision variables so as to simulate 
a diversity of possible reforms. 
We chose to build an exogenous, static microsimulation model. The model is static, as 
it allows us to evaluate the reform by characterizing the distribution of the financial 
burden before and after its implementation in a given year without modifying the 
population structure. It is exogenous in that it assumes that individual behavior remains 
unchanged in the face of the new reform. Moral hazard is not controlled. Nevertheless, 
similar to Keeler Newhouse and Phelps (1977), we simply assume that “demand (...) 
are likely to be insensitive to the size of the deductible above certain range” and that 
individual behavior remains unchanged. 
2.3.   Database
Our work base was constructed using 2006 data from the Health and Social Protection 
Survey (ESPS) database (socio-economic data) and the Permanent Sample of Socially 
Insured (EPAS: data on medical consumption). The EPAS data were used at the non-
aggregated level (in other words, at the level of each unit of consumption for each 
individual), so as to be able to recalculate the reimbursement and OOP payment variables 
on the hypothetical suppression of ALD-related exonerations. For each insured, the 
new simulated data essentially concern the amount reimbursed, copayments, charges 
exceeding statutory fees and OOP payments. After having combined EPAS and ESPS 
data, we isolated agents eligible for CMU and those not having consumed health care. 
Our final database was made up of a sample of 6,960 individuals.
Our  study  is  limited  to  ambulatory  services  and  standard  charges  not  exceeding 
statutory  fees.  The  modes  of  reimbursement  and  patients’  financial  contributions 
differ considerably according to whether they concern office-based care or hospital 
care. Reimbursements for less costly medical procedures administered via office-based 
care are effectively limited. On the contrary, hospital care and, notably, care related to 
chronic illness and diseases requiring expensive treatments are relatively well-reimbursed 
in France, as in the other European countries. In addition, the hospital sector captures 
the highest expenditures but only concerns 10 to 15% of the insured, whereas 85% of 
the sample used ambulatory care services. Creating an OOP maximum rule on the basis 
of cumulated total expenditures would have the effect of raising the OOP threshold 
and would carry the risk of penalizing insured agents that do not consume hospital 
services. On that basis, ambulatory care would practically no longer be reimbursed. This 
type of risk selection might challenge the general acceptability of the system as a whole. 
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as medical procedures practiced by GPs, medical auxiliaries, biological procedures, 
prescribed drugs or health-related transport. 
In addition, the analysis of patient OOP payments excludes charges exceeding statutory 
fees.  In  this  way,  we  remain  within  the  Social  Security  framework  that  does  not 
reimburse charges exceeding statutory fees. Taking these additional fees into account 
in the threshold rule can equally have the effect of generating moral hazard: patients 
may be less inclined to control their health expenditures, and GPs may be tempted to 
increase their fees. 
3.  Evaluating reforms: from ‘who are the winners and losers?’   
  to the redistributive characteristics of the compulsory  
  health care insurance scheme
To analyze the possible effects of this reform, our analysis is developed in three phases. 
In the first phase, we present the overall results obtained for the different scenarios 
tested. In a second phase, we identify the winners and the losers, and finally, we observe 
the redistributive effects on the health insurance system in terms of equity. 
3.1.   Initial observations
We initially concentrated on the distribution characteristics of current OOP payments. 
The current average OOP payment amounts to 223€, the maximum to 3,607€, and with 
equal standard deviation, 254€ (Table 1), which suggests an excessively broad dispersion of 
OOP payments. In addition, the average OOP payment is constant according to revenue 
deciles (Figure 1). The financial participation related to income, or the OOP payment-to-
income ratio, thus decreases according to revenue (Figure 2). It is approximately three times 
higher for individuals in the first decile in relation to individuals in the third decile. Current 
OOP payments are low for the majority of the population and extremely high for a small 
percentage (Figure 3). OOP payments are therefore concentrated among a small number of 
individuals: 40% of OOP payments weigh on 10% of the population. 
The first descriptive results enable us to obtain criteria permitting comparisons between 
the current situation and the potential situation for a given OOP threshold (Tables 1 
and 2). The coefficients enabling us to calculate OOP threshold values are the following: 
αUT =544, αIRT = 0.092, αIRTM =0.078. When the ALD criterion is taken into account, 
the coefficients for ‘non-ALD’ individuals are the following: αIRT = 804, αUT = 0.138,
αIRTM =0.114. They are two times lower than for individuals with ALD. As expected, 
the OOP threshold coefficients will be higher for ‘non-ALD’ individuals when the ALD 
criterion is taken into account. It produces a compensation effect from non-ALD to ALD.  
These coefficients allow us to calculate absolute and relative values for the different OOP 
maximum  thresholds  (Table  1-bis).  Consequently,  the  absolute  value  for  the  uniform 
threshold (UT) does not depend on income, whereas its relative value decreases according 
to income level. Wealthier households would therefore have relatively lower OOP payments 
than individuals with more modest incomes. Contrary to the uniform threshold, absolute 
values for the IRT and IRTM models increase with income level. For thresholds calculated 
according to income level, the absolute and relative values for the IRTM model will be lower 
for low-income households than the IRT model. Inversely, for higher income households, 
the relative and absolute values for the IRTM will be higher than for the IRT model.  Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                         12 
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The average OOP payment for each OOP maximum model being very close to 223€, the 
condition of equilibrium, or neutral effect on the insurance system, is validated. In effect, 
average losses and gains are equal to zero for each of the different safety net models; the 
Compulsory Health Care Insurance neither gains nor loses. Concerning the other descriptive 
statistics, the OOP maximum is equal to the UT threshold, whereas the maxima can be higher 
for income-related models (IRT = 3,638€ and IRTM = 4,504€). The standard deviations 
also change considerably according to the safety net model. Heterogeneity is reduced with 
the UT and IRT models, whereas it tends to increase with the IRTM. 
Whatever the OOP maximum model, the proportion of winners and losers is relatively 
low, at between 20 and 25% 10. A greater number of insured will be in a neutral position on 
the implementation of the Uniform Threshold; the OOP maximum is relatively high and 
the majority of individuals will never reach the threshold. The percentage of individuals 
impacted increases if income is taken into account in the safety net threshold definition, 
with the percentage of winners becoming higher than the percentage of losers (UT: 9.6% 
winners and 10.9% losers; IRTM: 14.1% winners and 10.1% losers). If one concentrates 
on the population with ALD, the percentage of neutrals is negligible regardless of the 
reforms envisaged. Individuals in ALD are essentially losers, but 15 to 27% are winners. 
OOP payments increase on average by 62 € for the UT and by 232 € for the IRTM, taking 
ALD into account. 
 
To better analyze the redistribution factor, we define I1 as the redistribution average and I2 
as the standard deviation of redistributions as follows:
I1 reveals that the redistribution average is clearly higher for the income-related threshold 
models. The same applies for I2: redistribution is higher with ‘ALD.’ According to the 
I1 and I2 indicators, the redistribution of OOP payments is higher among ALD than 
non-ALD individuals when safety net thresholds are related to income. 
OOP payment distribution according to income decile changes for the IRT and IRTM 
models, whereas the curve remains close to that of current OOP payments for the UT; 
in other words, it remains constant for each income decile (Figures 1-4). For the income-
related safety net models, OOP payments increase according to income decile: OOP 
payments for poorer individuals will be lower than the current level and respectively 
higher for wealthier individuals (Figure 1). Therefore, the financial participation related 
to income curve for income-related safety net thresholds tends to flatten and form a 
‘bell’ curve, contrary to the financial participation related to income curve for the UT, 
which remains unchanged in relation to the current financial participation related to 
income. The differences in financial participation related to income between income 
deciles are less for income-related health OOP maximum rules. 
10  According to the hypotheses retained, the losers can only be individuals on ALD. This does not, however, mean that 
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3.2.   Who loses? Who gains? How much?
These initial results incite us to look in more detail at the determinants of gaining or 
losing with the reforms implemented and the amounts transferred. 
In a first phase, we estimated the probability of being a winner or a loser using a 
logistic regression model (Table 2). For the three safety net threshold models, estimates 
show that the effect of age, being female and having supplementary health coverage 
increases the probability of gaining, whereas being on ALD with a poor health status 
has a negative effect on the probability of gaining. There is a non-linear effect of age 
on OOP payment levels. In addition, results clearly demonstrate the differences that 
distinguish the UT, IRT and IRTM models concerning the income effect. This effect 
is neutral for the UT and significantly non-linear for the IRT and IRTM. Furthermore, 
the single fact of being on ALD has a significantly positive effect on the probability of 
being on the losing side. As for the income effect, it becomes significantly positive for 
the IRT and IRTM: individuals will have a higher probability of being losers if their 
income is high and the OOP maximum threshold is related to income. 
In a second phase, we used a linear regression model to estimate the amounts gained and 
lost (Table 3). For the UT, the gains are higher if the individual is young, female and has 
supplementary health insurance. For the IRT and IRTM, the income effect is significant 
and higher for the IRTM model. The ALD status is significantly negative for both these 
models: an individual on ALD will gain less than a non-ALD. Health status is significant 
only for the IRTM; the effect of health status is negative and increasing. Consequently, 
an individual gains less, the poorer his/her health status. In terms of amounts lost, the 
estimated coefficient for the ALD status becomes positive and extremely high for all 
three safety net models and the losses higher for individuals on ALD. For the IRT and 
IRTM, a positive income effect is added and shows that losses are all the greater, the 
higher an individual’s income. 
3.3.   Analysis of equity and redistributivity 
The analysis in terms of equity is complementary to the initial descriptive analyses. One 
of the motivations behind these OOP safety net threshold analyses is to find a better 
redistributive equity and better risk coverage for the health insurance system. To achieve 
this, we use three different methods: the Kakwani index, ALJ decomposition of the 
redistributive effect and second-order stochastic dominance. 
The Kakwani index
The oldest way of measuring equity uses the difference between the Gini indices before 
and after the introduction of a reform or tax to measure the redistribution effect 
(Musgrave and Thin, 1948). This effect is defined as a lowering of the Gini coefficient. 
Kakwani (1977) demonstrated that this method explains the redistributive effect without 
measuring its progressivity. It fails to distinguish between the effect of a change in 
the average tax rate and its level of progressivity concerning income distribution. The 
Kakwani index is the difference between the concentration curve for OOP payments 
(COOP) and the concentration curve for income (CInc.). To measure the impact of a 
reform, we calculate the difference between the Kakwani index before and after the 
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The Kakwani index measures the proportionality gap between a tax system and taxpayers’ 
ability to pay. Wagstaff et al. (1999) used this index to quantify the progressivity or 
regressivity of a health system. They demonstrate that the redistribution effect of the 
health insurance system in the Netherlands transfers income from the poor to the rich, 
whereas in Great Britain or the United States, it is transferred from the rich to the poor. 
The Kakwani index calculated for the current situation is negative (Table 4). The 
reimbursement system is thus regressive or ‘pro-rich’ in that the distribution of OOP 
burden in relation to income favors the wealthiest (Wagstaff et al., 1999). In other 
words, the poorest individuals have a greater OOP burden proportional to their income 
than the wealthiest individuals. The Kakwani index calculated after the reform changes 
according to the safety net threshold model tested and varies from -0.262 for the UT 
to -0.103 for the IRTM11. The regressivity of the system is accentuated with a uniform 
threshold (UT), but the effect diminishes when income inequalities are taken into 
account.  The IRT and IRTM models redistribute the OOP burden in a way that is 
more favorable to low-income earners, contrary to the uniform threshold, which has a 
regressive redistribution effect in favor of the rich. If the ALD criterion is taken into 
account, the system characteristics (progressive or regressive) are unaltered. 
The  graphic  analyses  of  cumulative  OOP  payments  and  income  concentration 
curves equally confirm our results (Figure 5). The curve for current OOP payments 
concentration superimposes on the bisecting line. The situation is egalitarian without 
being equitable, in that individuals have the same OOP burden regardless of their 
income level. The OOP curve with a uniform threshold superimposes the current OOP 
payments curve. The OOP payments are, in effect, not dependent on income. On the 
contrary, with the IRT and IRTM models, the concentration curves remain, for the 
most part, above the income curve but remain close. The system remains regressive but 
becomes marginally more equitable. 
Moreover, for 20% of the population with the lowest incomes, the cumulated sum 
of OOP payments is proportionally lower than the cumulated sum of their incomes 
(Figure 5). The income-related threshold rules favor the lowest income population for 
whom the system becomes progressive. 
AJL Analysis
One of Kakwani’s hypotheses, however, is that individuals with equal incomes are faced 
with the same tax. The reality is, however, far more complex. Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert (1994) demonstrate that the differences in concentration indices before and 
after a reform can be written in the following manner (the AJL decomposition):
where V stands for vertical equity, H for horizontal equity, and R for the reranking 
effect. The vertical effect can also be decomposed with g, the average tax rate, and K, 
the Kakwani progressivity index that measures the extent of income distortion before 
financing the tax. 
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Concerning the analysis of health insurance systems, V measures the vertical effect 
of  redistribution.  It  depends  on  progressivity  but  also  on  the  average  rate  g  that 
corresponds to the percentage of income devoted to average health expenditures. The 
higher the average rate, the greater the redistribution effect. The vertical effect shows 
how households with different incomes are affected by the reimbursement method. 
The horizontal effect measures the inequality generated among households with the 
same income, whereas reranking quantifies the change in OOP payments distribution 
occasioned by the reform (Zhong, 2009). 
The hypothesis underlying the income-related OOP threshold modifies the distribution 
of the OOP burden such that it takes into consideration inequalities stemming from 
income distribution. Consequently, bringing the distribution of the OOP burden closer 
to a vertical equity situation, this distribution must be the most unequal. It is thus 
necessary to obtain the greatest possible vertical effect12 (because V is negative). From 
the point of view of vertical equity in health, the ‘non-equal’ must be treated differently. 
Individuals with different incomes should not benefit from the same reimbursement 
levels and thus should have a different OOP burden.   
The  horizontal  effect  measures  equity  between  groups  of  individuals  with  equal 
incomes13. H is measured as the weighted sum of Gini indices of income diminished by 
OOP on sub-populations with equal incomes. It is expressed as follows: 
where G j
OOP reform  represents the Gini index of income diminished by OOP payments 
according to the different threshold models for a group of individuals βj with the equal 
incomes, and   is the product of the percentage of the population in group k and OOP 
payments proportional to income after the introduction of the associated threshold 
model. By construction, the H component is defined as being non-negative. Horizontal 
equity can thus only reduce the redistribution effect but not increase it. Individuals 
with similar financial resources should have the same health insurance benefits. The 
horizontal effect is an indicator that reflects the way in which close-equal individuals 
are treated. In the attempt to improve equity, H must have the highest possible value. 
The R component captures the reranking effect occasioned by changes incurred when 
OOP payments distribution is taken before and after implementation of the reform. It 
is measured by: 
where GOOP reform represents the income concentration index diminished by OOP 
payments,  and  COOP  reform    the  concentration  index  for  OOP  payments  after  the 
introduction of an OOP threshold, calculated by classifying individuals by equal income 
sub-populations and OOP payments’ levels within each sub-population group. The R 
component cannot be negative. It is related to the Atkinson-Plotnick reranking measure 
(Atkinson, 1980 and Plotnick, 1981). If the desired objective is to redistribute the OOP 
12  This reasoning is the opposite to that used in analyzing income tax effects on income, for which the significant ver-
tical effect means that the income curve after tax is more egalitarian and therefore more equitable in this particular 
case.
13  One important question is: are horizontal inequities truly inequitable? Indeed, if we think the differences in OOP 
payments  due to differences in health status vs differences in health preferences or if the differences in OOP 
payments due to no health care needs vs. postponement of health care consumption or unmet needs, distributional 
consequences and policy implications will not be the same. One solution will be to introduce in our model the level 
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burden to make it more equitable, it is necessary to maximize this indicator. To calculate 
R,  it  is  thus  necessary  to  define  income  intervals.  The  bandwidth  determines  the 
magnitude of the horizontal and reranking effects (van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert, 
2001 and Bliger, 2008). The wider the bandwidths, the lesser the horizontal effect (due 
to the size of population sub-groups), and the greater the reranking effect (due to the 
higher number of population sub-groups). It is for this reason that we have calculated 
this decomposition with four different bandwidths14.
The  current  redistribution  effect  (RE)  is  negative  (Table  4).  This  means  that  the 
redistribution effect related to the system of calculating OOP payments according to 
income favors the higher income group (Van Doorslaer et al., 1999). If one looks at the 
current distribution between V, H and R calculated from income intervals represented 
by centiles, the vertical effect represents 66% of the redistribution, the horizontal effect 
12% and the reranking effect 27% (for bandwidths equal to 100).
Concerning  the  distribution  impact  after  introducing  the  OOP  thresholds,  the 
redistribution effect (RE) for the UT model is close to the current situation. On the 
contrary, for the income-related health OOP threshold, IRT and IRTM, the redistribution 
values increase but remain negative. Moreover, the vertical equity (V), horizontal equity 
(H), and the reranking effect (R) change according to the OOP threshold model being 
tested. In comparison with the current situation, V and R decrease with the UT. With 
the IRT and IRTM, V and R increase. This confirms that the situation becomes more 
regressive with the UT and less regressive, and thus more equitable, with the income-
related thresholds. Regardless of the threshold model, values relating to horizontal 
equity are relatively stable, which reflects low iniquity within population classes with 
equal income. Individuals with similar incomes pay the same amount of OOP payments. 
The  analysis  of  distribution  between  vertical  equity  (%V  =  V  /  RE),  horizontal 
equity (%H = - H / RE) and the reranking effect (%R = - R / RE) in percentages of 
redistribution confirm these results15. In effect, compared with the current situation, 
the percentage of V increases and the percentage of R decreases in the UT model, 
whereas for the IRT and the IRTM, the percentage of V decreases and the percentage 
of R increases. There is an inversion of progressivity between the percentage of the 
vertical effect and the percentage of the reranking effect. An increase in the percentage 
of V is synonymous with a more regressive system, which means that OOP payments 
distribution will be less redistributive. As the percentage of H remains relatively stable, if 
the percentage of V increases, then the percentage of R will diminish and consequently 
lower the reranking effect. 
The analysis of the redistribution effects of the different threshold models on the 
Kakwani index and ALJ decomposition reveals that the consequences in terms of 
redistribution will not be identical, according to the type of threshold model chosen. 
The UT will tend towards greater inequality and, as a result, further dissociate OOP 
payments from income. Inversely, the IRT and IRTM models give a more unequal 
redistribution but in favor of poorer individuals, which, in this context, would make the 
health insurance benefits system more equitable. 
14  Ten intervals; 696 individuals on average per interval, 50 intervals; 139 individuals on average per interval, 100 
intervals; 70 individuals on average per interval and, 250 intervals; 28 individual on average per interval.
15  Evolutions in terms of level and percentage of V will be different because we are in a regressive distribution system.Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                        17 
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Second order stochastic dominance
The final criterion to better characterize the system does not measure equity but rather 
the notion of individuals’ risk aversion in relation to insurance. Second-order stochastic 
dominance is used to measure the preferences of the ‘risk-phobic’ insured when faced 
with a change in the reimbursement system (Geoffard and De Lagasnerie, 2009). Using 
the ‘veil of ignorance’ hypothesis, whereby individuals ignore their health status, second-
order stochastic dominance asserts that individuals with risk aversion will prefer one 
form of OOP payments distribution to another if OOP payments distributions have 
the same average and if the Lorenz curves associated with the two types of distribution 
only bisect once (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). Therefore, if a reform reduces risks 
(in the second-order stochastic dominance sense), all of the agents with risk aversion 
should prefer it. 
The  Lorenz  curves  obtained  from  the  UT  stochastically  dominate  the  current 
distribution pattern at second order (Figure 6 and Table 4). We confirm this graphic 
analysis by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. This is not the case for income-related 
thresholds. Individuals with risk aversion will then prefer the uniform threshold solution 
because the maximum OOP burden remains relatively low and thus protects them from 
catastrophic risks. This confirms the descriptive analyses showing that the standard 
deviation for the lowest OOP payments was obtained with the UT model (Table 1). 
Conclusion
The aim of this work is to measure the redistributive effect of an integral reform of 
the reimbursement rules for health care costs. The idea is to test the replacement of the 
current 100% reimbursement system for patients with long-term illnesses with an OOP 
maximum  threshold  to  limit  catastrophic  out-of-pocket  payments.  Different  safety 
net models, either based on a uniform threshold or an income-related threshold, are 
proposed. The results are obtained using an exogenous, static microsimulation model. It 
is thus assumed that individual behavior does not change. This hypothesis may seem far-
fetched, but it enables a first round observation of OOP payments’ transfers without 
making other hypotheses concerning behavior. It would be possible to measure the 
sensitivity of our results by taking into account modifications in behavior. 
With the ARAMMIS static microsimulation model, IRDES armed itself with a powerful, 
permanent analysis tool that enables a better understanding of the effects of extremely 
specific reforms. The simulations presented are not aimed at finding the ‘right reform’ 
but rather at describing reform impacts and, in so doing, providing policy-makers 
with an objective viewpoint. The model is in the construction phase in that we aim to 
complete it with additional modules concerning hospitals, supplementary insurance and 
contributions. 
Our results only concern health insurance reimbursements and do not take individuals’ 
statutory income-related contributions into account. The notion of equity discussed 
here is also only partial. In a future development of this study, we will also model social 
security contributions so as to study the equity of the system as a whole. The aim in this 
paper being to study the evolution of reimbursement rules, the only variables required 
were those on the ‘expenses’ side, that is, the modes of covering expenditures, as the 
‘resources’ side is invariant. In addition, our results do not take into account OOP 
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members of the population. It thus strongly modifies the redistributive characteristics 
of the health expenditure reimbursement system. 
Initial results indicate that all the envisaged scenarios lead to an increase in OOP from 
62€ to 232€ per year for patients on ALD. All of the estimations were carried out 
using identical budgetary constraints. Naturally, there is a change in OOP distribution, 
but not all patients on ALD would be losers. According to the different safety net 
models retained, from 15% to 27% of ALD beneficiaries would be winners, namely, 
patients currently paying high OOP payments. In effect, the heterogeneity of OOP 
is greater among ALD beneficiaries than non-ALD beneficiaries. These first results 
indicate that the characteristics of winners and losers are highly dependent on the 
OOP threshold module. An income-related threshold, for example, would favor lower 
income groups, whereas, with a uniform OOP threshold, income has no importance in 
the determination of winners and losers. 
The effects of these two main reform concepts, uniform or income-related OOP-safety 
net thresholds, currently being broached in the public debate are not identical and lead 
to contrary conclusions. In reducing the risk of being faced with a very high OOP 
burden, uniform thresholds level out the heterogeneity of situations and appear to suit 
individuals with high risk aversion. Inversely, income-related thresholds increase the 
heterogeneity of OOP burdens but have a less regressive redistributive effect - moving 
from an egalitarian system to a more equitable system. 
Implementing reforms such as these would inevitably raise a number of questions: an 
OOP threshold for individuals or households? An OOP payment threshold concerning 
ambulatory care only or the totality of expenditures (ambulatory + hospital care)? 
Would dental and optical expenditures be included? What role should be played by 
supplementary health insurance? All of these questions need to be studied in detail 
because, as we have demonstrated, ‘the devil is in the details!’ 
The different health systems throughout the world partially reflect the way individuals 
perceive the notion of social justice. The ‘political’ choice concerning the way OOP 
payments are calculated will, in the same way, reflect what French society considers 
to be socially acceptable and fair in terms of health insurance (Rawls, 1971). In that 
context, French society will have to resolve the dilemma between equality and equity: at 
what point does the search for absolute equality become inequitable? Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                        19 
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Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics of OOP maximum 
  Current
UT IRT IRTM
- with ALD - with ALD - with ALD
Population as a whole
Average OOP  223 223 223 223 223 223 223
Standard-deviation of OOP  254 186 198 247 238 282 268
Maximum 3607 544 804 3638 2734 4504 3983
OOP maximum value 544 804 0,092 0,138 0,078 0,114
Average win or loss  0 0 0 0 0 0
% of gainers 9,64 6,14 12,51 9,76 14,05 11,62
% of losers 10,87 9,72 10,41 9,73 10,13 9,47
% of neutral 79,49 84,14 77,08 80,51 75,82 78,91
I1 257 224 291 269 305 288
I2   367 342 438 408 502 477
Population on ALD
Average OOP 294 453 356 499 425 526 458
Standard-deviation of OOP 336 149 96 388 326 527 472
Maximum 3581 544 402 3637 2734 4504 3983
OOP maximum value 402 0,069 0,057
Average win or loss -159 -62 -206 -132 -232 -164
% of gainers 15,33 25,06 18,88 25,06 20,93 26,88
% of losers 81,81 72,19 78,38 72,42 76,31 70,59
% of neutral 2,86 2,74 2,54 2.51 2,74 2,51
I1 267 226 333 291 368 333
I2   361 332 491 432   607 547
Tab. 1-bis: Threshold value for each OOP maximum
Taking into account the Ald criterion
Without ALD With ALD
UT IRT IRTM UT IRT IRTM UT IRT IRTM
Threshold coefficient (α ) 544 0.092 0.078 804 0.138 0.114 402 0.069 0.057
Absolute value of threshold
 Annual inc per CU= 12 000  544 444 376 804 666 550 402 333 275
24 000 544 1548 2252 804 2322 3291 402 1161 1646
36 000 544 2652 5623 804 3978 8219 402 1989 4109
Relative value of threshold 
 Annual inc per CU = 12 000  4,5% 3,7% 3,1% 6,7% 5,5% 4,6% 3,4% 2,8% 2,3%
24 000 2,3% 6,5% 9,4% 3,4% 9,7% 13,7% 1,7% 4,8% 6,9%
36 000 1,5% 7,4% 15,6% 2,2% 11,0% 22,8% 1,1% 5,5% 11,4%Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                         20 
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Fig. 1: OOP payments according to income decile
                                               -                   taking ALD beneficiaries into account
Fig. 2: OPP payments related to income according to income decile 
                                               -                   taking ALD beneficiaries into account
Fig. 3: OOP payments distribution 
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Tab. 4: Analysis of redistribution equity
Current UT IRT IRTM
    - with ALD - with ALD - with ALD
Equity Analysis 
Kakwani index before the reform -0,250
Kakwani index after the reform  -0,262 -0,258 -0,112 -0,132 -0,085 -0,103
Effect of the reform 0,011 0,007 -0,138 -0,118 -0,166 -0,148
Conclusion (from regressif (Reg) to) more Reg more Reg less Reg less Reg less Reg less Reg
               
Redistribution analysis 
bandwidth = 10
RE (=V-H-R) -0,066 -0,060 -0,061 -0,043 -0,045 -0,045 -0,046
V -0,044 -0,045 -0,044 -0,027 -0,030 -0,023 -0,025
V% 66,036 74,886 73,314 63,226 65,517 52,298 55,300
H 0,019 0,014 0,015 0,010 0,011 0,010 0,011
%H 29,158 23,263 24,450 22,628 24,621 23,001 24,902
R 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,006 0,004 0,011 0,009
%R 4,806 1,851 2,236 14,146 9,863 24,701 19,798
bandwidth = 50
RE (=V-H-R) -0,066 -0,060 -0,061 -0,043 -0,045 -0,045 -0,046
V -0,044 -0,046 -0,046 -0,020 -0,024 -0,015 -0,018
V% 67,244 77,312 75,330 46,288 52,244 34,059 40,295
H 0,008 0,006 0,007 0,007 0,007 0,007 0,007
%H 11,529 10,621 10,853 15,475 15,230 15,144 15,183
R 0,014 0,007 0,008 0,017 0,015 0,023 0,020
%R 21,227 12,067 13,817 38,238 32,525 50,797 44,523
bandwidth = 100
RE (=V-H-R) -0,066 -0,060 -0,061 -0,043 -0,045 -0,045 -0,046
V -0,044 -0,046 -0,045 -0,020 -0,023 -0,015 -0,018
V% 66,410 76,576 74,601 45,251 51,198 33,192 39,390
H 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
%H 6,711 6,329 6,437 9,278 9,059 9,074 9,031
R 0,018 0,010 0,011 0,020 0,018 0,026 0,024
%R 26,879 17,095 18,962 45,471 39,743 57,734 51,579
bandwidth = 250
RE (=V-H-R) -0,066 -0,060 -0,061 -0,043 -0,045 -0,045 -0,046
V -0,044 -0,046 -0,045 -0,020 -0,023 -0,015 -0,018
V% 66,725 77,013 74,962 45,964 51,724 33,916 39,957
H 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002
%H 2,949 2,786 2,839 4,213 4,091 4,140 4,098
R 0,020 0,012 0,013 0,022 0,020 0,028 0,026
%R 30,326 20,201 22,198   49,822 44,185   61,943 55,945
2nd order stochastic dominance 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test 
Conclusion SD (2) SD (2)  --  -- -- --Document de travail n° 34 - IRDES - Novembre 2010                                         24 
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Fig. 4 : Lorenz curve for cumulative OOP payments 
                                           -                                       taking ALD beneficiaries into account
Fig. 5 : Concentration curve for cumulative OOP payments
                                            -                                       taking ALD beneficiaries into account
Fig. 6 : Cumulated distribution of OOP payments
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Out-of-Pocket Maximum Rules under a Compulsory Health Care Insurance Scheme:
A Choice between Equality and Equity
Thierry Debrand (Irdes), Christine Sorasith (Irdes)
Using the microsimulation model ARAMMIS, this study attempts to measure the impacts of introducing an 
out-of-pocket (OOP) maximum threshold, or a safety net threshold, on consumer copayments for health 
care financed by the abolition of the Long-term Illness Regime (ALD) in France. The analysis is based on a 
comparison of different safety net threshold rules and their redistributive effects on patients’ OOP payments. 
We attach particular importance to indicators that bring to light changes in OOP payment levels and measure 
their impact on the equity of OOP distribution. The first section outlines the French National Health System to 
provide a better understanding of the stakes involved in reforming the health care reimbursement rules under 
the Compulsory Health Care Insurance scheme. In the second section, we describe the hypotheses retained, the 
database and the microsimulation model. The final section presents key findings, measuring the impact of the 
reform at both individual and system levels.
Bouclier sanitaire : choisir entre égalité et équité
Une analyse à partir du modèle ARAMMIS
Thierry Debrand (Irdes), Christine Sorasith (Irdes)
Cet article cherche à mesurer, à l’aide du modèle d’Analyse des réformes de l’Assurance maladie par micro-
simulation statique (ARAMMIS), les effets de la mise en place d’un bouclier sanitaire financé par la suppression 
du régime des affections de longue durée (ALD). Notre étude repose sur la comparaison des conséquences 
redistributives de différentes règles de boucliers sur les restes à charge des patients dans le secteur ambulatoire 
en France. Nous attachons une importance particulière aux indicateurs permettant de mettre en évidence les 
modifications des restes à charge et de mesurer l’évolution du système en termes d’équité. Nous présentons, 
dans une première partie, le cadre général du système de santé en France pour mieux comprendre le contexte et 
les enjeux d’une refonte du mode de remboursement lié à l’Assurance maladie obligatoire. Dans une deuxième 
partie, nous décrivons les hypothèses retenues, la base de données et le modèle de micro-simulation. Enfin, nous 
consacrons la dernière partie à la présentation des principaux résultats mesurant l’impact de la réforme tant au 
niveau des individus qu’au niveau du système.